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Should a criminal be able to evade prosecution for money 
laundering simply by channeling illegal funds through an account that 
contains “clean” money in addition to the “dirty” proceeds of crime? 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently tackled this matter for 
the first time in United States v. Haddad.1 In Haddad, a grocery store 
owner convicted of food stamp fraud was found to have channeled 
both the profit of fraud and his legitimate profit through the business’ 
operating account.2 The court was required to determine whether the 
commingling of the funds could foil the evidentiary requirements of a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, a money laundering statute 
whose key element is that the transaction involves “knowingly 
engaging in or attempting to engage in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property that is valued greater than $10,000.”3 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006). 
2 Id. at 791. 
3 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006). 
1
Snedigar: Loose Change: The Seventh Circuit Misses an Opportunity to Clarif
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
606 
Noting that the issue was one of first impression, and that it had 
engendered a circuit split amongst the other courts to have addressed 
it, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the commingling of funds would 
not foil prosecution.4 While the Seventh Circuit achieved the correct 
result in Haddad, they missed an opportunity to reconcile the 
decisions of the other circuits and articulate a test that fits precedent, 
the tests of other circuit courts, and the legislative goals incorporated 
in § 1957 and its companion statute 18 U.S.C. § 1956.5 By failing to 
articulate a test that correctly incorporates legislative intent and 
precedent, the Seventh Circuit did nothing to clarify § 1957 law.6 
 Part I of this Comment will provide a brief look at the history of 
money laundering law in the United States, including discussion of the 
legislative history of both 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and § 1957 and an 
examination of the primary cases which deal with money laundering 
and which serve as background for the decisions of the Seventh 
Circuit. Part II will detail the circumstances in US v. Haddad, and 
examine how the court came to their decision. Part III will analyze the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision and critique its rationale. Part IV will 
discuss the potential effects of the Seventh Circuit’s holding and 
discuss how the court missed an opportunity to clarify and distinguish 




A. Money Laundering Law 
 
Fundamentally, money laundering is “the process by which one 
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, 
and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”7 The ability to 
                                                 
4 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED 
CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984).  
2
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conceal the origin and nature of funds and to turn those funds into 
“clean” money is an essential part of any large scale criminal 
endeavor.8 Prior to passage of federal money laundering statutes, the 
federal government relied on a combination of Title 21 conspiracy 
provisions, Title 31 currency transaction reporting, and Title 18 
conspiracy statutes to prosecute money laundering activities.9 In the 
mid 1980’s, the huge profits generated by drug cartels and the 
proliferation of schemes to circumvent currency reporting laws 
inspired President Reagan to form a commission to investigate money 
laundering.10 It soon became clear that financial institutions were 
turning a blind eye towards transactions which were clearly designed 
to circumvent established reporting requirements.11 In response to the 
commission’s findings, Congress passed the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986 (the “Act”), which was codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1956, 1957.12 
                                                 
8 See Chirstopher Boran, Money Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847, 848 
(2003). 
9 G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s, 27 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 149, 150 (1989); see, e.g., Untied States v. Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1578 
(11th Cir 1986) (combination of Title 18 and Title 31 statutes). 
10 See Executive Order 12,435 on July, 28 1983; see also Strafer, supra note 9, 
at 150 (“The money laundering legislation developed from three otherwise disparate 
doctrinal threads (a) an evolving law of conspiracy; (b) forfeiture law; and (c) law 
enforcement authorities' perceived difficulties with enforcement of the currency 
transaction reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act”). 
11 See Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering as they Involve 
Financial Institutions: Hearings on H.R 1367, H.R. 1474, H.R.1945, H.R. 2785, H.R. 
3892, H.R. 4280 and H.R. 4573 Before the Subcom. On Financial Institutions 
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, 99TH CONG. 79-109 (1986) (statement of Mr. Friedburg, former 
money launderer, who testified that he would often convert as much as $100,000 in 
cash per day into cashier's checks at south Florida banks in increments of $9,000, 
below the $10,000 reporting threshold, a practice known as “smurfing”); see also 
Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The 
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1989) (Generally, federal 
“anti-smurfing” law and structuring crimes). 
12 See Strafer, supra note 9, at 161. 
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Section 1956 criminalizes financial transactions that are intended 
to hide the proceeds of crimes ranging from securities fraud to 
espionage to smuggling and drug trafficking.13 Section 1956 defines 
two categories of offense, “transaction” offenses, and “transportation” 
offenses.14 To commit a “transaction” offense, one must: 
 
1) “conduct” or “attempt” to conduct; 
2) a “financial transaction”; 
3) “involv[ing]” property which represents the 
“proceeds of specified unlawful activity”; 
4) “knowing” that the property constitutes “proceeds” 
of “some” unlawful activity.15 
 
Section 1956 (a)(1)(A) goes on to require intent to either promote 
“the carrying on of specified unlawful activities” or to violate certain 
tax codes.16 Section 1956 (a)(1)(B) requires knowledge either that the 
transaction is intended to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location, 
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity” or knowledge that the transaction is meant to “avoid 
a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law.”17 
Section 1956 (a)(2) targets the transportation of funds involved in 
criminal activity.18 This section defines transportation as 
“transportation, transmi[ssion] and transfer” of “a monetary instrument 
or funds” from place to place in the United States, or to or from the 
United States to a “place outside the United States.”19 A third section, 
§ 1956 (a)(3), serves to criminalize transfers in property “represented 
                                                 
13 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1), (a)(1)(D)(2006). 
14 Id. at § 1956 (a). 
15 Id. at § 1956 (a)(1); see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 161. 
16 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A) 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at § 1956 (a)(2) 
19 Id.  
4
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to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” providing criminal 
penalties for those caught in government “sting” operations.20 
Section 1956 does not have any minimum value requirement.21 
This makes sense in the context of the legislative origins of the law as 
a tool to deal with structuring crimes meant to evade the requirements 
of the bank secrecy act, with its currency reporting requirements.22 It 
also sheds light on the congressional intent of 18 U.S.C § 1957, which 
has as its central tenet neither a laundry list of predicate offenses nor 
intent to further the criminal activity, but a minimum value limit of 
$10,000 in criminally derived property.23 
 Section 1957 targets anyone who “knowingly engages or attempts 
to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a 
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful 
activity.”24 As such, it is potentially much broader than § 1956, which 
requires that the money come from a specified illegal activity and be 
concealed in an attempt to further that activity.25 Importantly, unlike § 
1956, it is not necessary for the accused to actually launder the funds, 
or posses any specific intent to “promote the carrying on of specified 
unlawful activity.”26 Section 1957 applies to any and every transaction 
totaling $10,000 in illegally generated funds, enabling it to affect 
                                                 
20 Id. at § 1956 (a)(3); see also Max Kaufman et al., Money Laundering, 34 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 793, 797 (1997) (“it is illegal to conduct a financial transaction 
involving property represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of a 
specified unlawful activity” as long as the other intent factors are present). 
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
22 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2006); see also The Money Laundering 
Crimes Act of 1986, S. REP. NO. 433, 99TH CONG. 
23 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a), with 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
24 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956; see also Kaufman et al., supra note 20, at 798 (It is 
suggested § 1957 is broad enough to criminalize seemingly “innocent” acts or 
commercial transactions); see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 160 (“section 1957 
potentially is a much broader section”). 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i). 
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almost any transaction.27 Indeed, many scholars have noted that this 
section is “broad enough to criminalize seemingly ‘innocent’ acts or 
commercial transactions.”28 This however, was arguably Congress’ 
intent.29 Most scholars stress that the law requires only that the 
violator in a § 1957 case knowingly engage in the transaction 
involving criminally derived property.30  
 
B. Cases Dealing with Money Laundering 
 
 Despite federal money laundering laws being more than two 
decades old, there is a virtual absence of Supreme Court case law. 
Only Whitfield v. U.S., which held in part that a money laundering 
conviction does not require an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy deals with money laundering law in a substantial way.31 
Other Supreme Court cases have obliquely dealt with money 
laundering through questions of venue, or in questions of sentencing 
or forfeiture. 32 The Supreme Court has never decided a case which 
involved a question of commingled funds in either a § 1956 or § 1957 
prosecution. 
 While the Supreme Court has hardly dealt with money laundering 
laws, and has not touched the subject of commingled funds, the lower 
courts have tackled the issue on several occasions.33 Generally, the 
                                                 
27 See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“statute 
applies to the most open, above-board transaction”). 
28 Kaufman et al., supra note 20, at 798; see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 161.  
29 See Boran, supra note 8, at 853 (quoting Representative Lundgren: “It is 
time for us to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, '[i]f you know that person is 
a trafficker and has this income derived from the offense, you better beware of 
dealing with that person'” H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, pt. 1, at 14 (1986)). 
30 See Boran, supra note 8, at 853. 
31 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 534 U.S. 1 (1998) (venue question); 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (dealing with sentencing questions); United 
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeiture question). 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076 (11th 
6
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money laundering statutes have been attacked with little success on a 
variety of grounds.34 Some rejected challenges have been grounded in 
the theory that the law is too vague to be constitutionally viable.35 In 
dealing with challenges raised under a theory that prosecution for both 
the predicate offense and money laundering amounts to double 
jeopardy, courts have generally found that money laundering and the 
unlawful activity which generated the illicit funds are separate 
offenses, separately punishable.36 Money laundering laws have also 
been challenged unsuccessfully on grounds that some individual 
money laundering crimes do not substantially affect interstate 
commerce, placing them outside the regulation of Congress.37 
 The issue of commingling of funds has been addressed by the 
various circuit courts in several cases.38 The majority of these cases, 
however, deal with prosecutions under § 1956, which lacks § 1957’s 
language requiring that the transaction involve “criminally derived 
property of a value greater than $10,000.”39 In fact, dissecting the 
language of many of the § 1956 cases dealing with commingling of 
                                                                                                                   
Cir. 1999; United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1995);); United 
States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 
(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 
1250 (8th Cir. 1990).  
34 Boran, supra note 8 at 865 (“Three theories that have been used to attack the 
Money Laundering Act with virtually no success are constitutional vagueness, 
double jeopardy, and impermissibility of the Congressional act”). 
35 Id.; see also United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that “some form of illegal activity is adequately defined”). 
36 Boran, supra note 8 at 865-66; see also United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 
1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1546 (9th Cir. 
1996) (conviction for money laundering and underlying offense is not double 
jeopardy). 
37 Boran, supra note 8, at 866; see also United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221 
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the use of federally insured banks or the transportation 
of money across state lines creates sufficient nexus with interstate commerce). 
38 See, e.g., Baker, 227 F.3d 955; Davis, 226 F.3d 346; Ward, 197 F.3d 1076; 
Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116; Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359; Moore, 27 F.3d 969; Johnson, 971 
F.2d 562; Jackson, 935 F.2d 832. 
39 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (emphasis added). 
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funds, the lack of a floor value is one of the key factors in determining 
that the combined funds can form the basis for prosecution.40 Rather, § 
1956 (c)(1) specifies that “the term ‘knowing that the property 
involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
form of unlawful activity’ means that the person knew the property 
involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form . . . 
of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign 
law.”41 In United States v. Jackson, for example, Judge Flaum of the 
Seventh Circuit said, “[w]e do not read Congress’s use of the word 
‘involve’ as imposing the requirement that the government trace the 
origin of all funds deposited into a bank account to determine exactly 
which funds were used for what transaction.”42 This language is 
repeated and agreed with by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Garcia.43 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Tencer again reiterated 
the courts’ holdings that § 1956 prosecutions can be upheld by the 
involvement of funds, without the need to trace all funds to a specified 
transaction.44 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of commingling funds 
in United States v. Baker, a case which was mentioned in the Haddad 
decision.45 In this case, Baker, who ran an illegal prostitution 
operation as part of a business that also consisted of a legal sex shop 
and strip club, appealed money laundering charges under § 1956.46 
Baker alleges that the government must separate out the income from 
                                                 
40 See Baker, 227 F.3d at 965-66; United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576 
(7th Cir. 2000). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(1) (emphasis added). 
42 Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840. 
43 Garcia, 37 F.3d at 1365. 
44 United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1131 (5th Cir. 1997). 
45 See generally Baker, 227 F.3d 955. Baker, convicted of money laundering 
and conspiracy relating to a prostitution ring run in conjunction with a legitimate 
adult book and video store, striptease bar, and x-rated video arcade, alleged that the 
government had to take into account the fact that some of the proceeds were “clean.” 
The court found that the “clean” and “unclean” funds, once commingled, became 
forfeitable. 
46 Id. at 959. 
8
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his legitimate business from that which he gleaned from sexual 
services for the purpose of prosecution under the money laundering 
laws.47 Again citing cases such as Jackson, and Tencer, Judge Flaum 
found that there was no need for the government to trace the proceeds 
to the individual transactions.48 The Seventh Circuit, relying on the 
language of the Tencer and Jackson decisions, correctly held that it is 
not necessary to separate “bona fide” income from illegal income 
because all income is “involved in” the conspiracy that facilitated the 
crime as a whole.49 It is important to note, however, that all of the 
cases cited in the court’s decision are cases which deal specifically 
with § 1956 violations, violations which have no minimum value 
requirement.50 Baker is notable too for the fact that while Baker was 
charged with six counts of violating § 1957, that particular statute was 
not mentioned after the initial recitation of the charges lodged against 
Baker.51 
 While there is a fairly substantial body of case law dealing with 
the commingling of funds in § 1956 cases that generally indicates that 
commingling will not defeat prosecution, there are only a few cases 
that specifically address commingling of funds in § 1957 
prosecutions.52 These include United States v. Moore, United States v. 
Davis and United States v. Rutgard.53 These three cases dealing 
specifically with commingled funds in § 1957 prosecutions are the 
three main cases that the Seventh Circuit used to decide Haddad.54 
 In both Moore and Davis, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 
respectively determined that commingled funds can be treated as 
                                                 
47 Id. at 965. 
48 Id. at 965-66. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See generally id. 
52 See, e.g., id. at 965; United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1120, 1131 (5th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United 
States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 
346 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994). 
53 Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270; Davis, 226 F.3d 346; Moore, 27 F.3d 969.  
54 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2006) 
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illegitimate for the purposes of a § 1957 prosecution.55 In Moore, the 
Fourth Circuit was faced with a transaction that involved the sale of 
commercial condominiums that were purchased primarily with money 
from fraudulently acquired loans.56 After selling the condominiums, 
Moore deposited the proceeds of the sale, some $37,000, in a federally 
insured bank, giving rise to the § 1957 charge.57 The court found that, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the $37,000 was 
criminally derived property.58 One important aspect of this decision is 
that the commingling of funds occurred when fraudulent funds were 
mixed with a small amount of legitimate money in a real estate 
investment.59 While the court noted that “money is fungible” a 
condominium complex is certainly not, and “the illicitly-acquired 
funds and the legitimately-acquired funds (or the respective portions 
of the property purchased with each) cannot be distinguished from 
each other.”60  
The court in Moore relied on a variety of sources to determine 
that commingling cannot defeat prosecution.61 First, they cited cases 
such as Johnson and Jackson, which deal with commingling of funds 
in § 1956 cases.62 The court also discussed the use of arbitrary 
accounting methods as one way of determining the value, though the 
case they cited, United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, dealt with 
an entirely different forfeiture law.63 Through this lens, the court 
                                                 
55 See Moore, 27 F.3d at 976-77; Davis, 226 F.3d at 355-56. 
56 Moore, 27 F.3d at 971-72. 
57 Id. at 975. 
58 Id. at 977. 
59 Id. at 976-77. 
60 Id. 
61 See id.  
62 Id. at 976 
63 See id. at 977; see also United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 
1154, 1159-60 (2nd Cir. 1986) (dealing with forfeiture of drug profits contained in a 
“commingled” account. The Court determines that, given the burden of proof 
required in the circumstances presented, the government has a right to use what 
amounts to either an “illegal-funds in, last out” or “illegal-funds in, first out” 
10
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determined that “the transacted funds, at least up to the full amount 
derived from crime, were the proceeds of the criminal activity or 
derived from that activity.”64 Importantly, none of the precedent relied 
upon dealt with crimes prosecuted under § 1957.65 Jackson, Johnson, 
and United States v. Blackmun all dealt with prosecutions under § 
1956, while United States v. Heath dealt with other bank fraud 
statutes.66 
 In United States v. Davis the funds in question were derived from 
an advance-fee scheme in which Davis took money from clients to 
procure funding through his supposed access to valuable financial 
instruments.67 Davis first argued unsuccessfully that the criminal 
transactions were not completed by the time that the transactions 
charged were undertaken, meaning that they could not have been 
“criminally derived.”68 Davis then alleged that there was insufficient 
evidence that he withdrew more than the $10,000 value limit required 
by § 1957 from the account where he had both legitimate and 
fraudulently obtained funds.69 The Fifth Circuit court, following their 
own rule in Heath, found that the important factor was whether the 
aggregate withdrawals exceeded the amount of “clean funds” 
available.70 The court found that “the government proved aggregate 
                                                                                                                   
accounting method, at their discretion to overcome the lenient “probable cause for a 
forfeiture” standard established by Congress). 
64 Moore, 27 F.3d at 977. 
65 See id.  
66 See United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (5th Cir. 1992) (In a 
bank fraud case, aggregate total of withdrawals in question far exceeds the value of 
legitimate funds available), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 (1993); United States v. 
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 
832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackmun, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 
1990) (section 1956 conviction of drug dealer for four wire transfers with an 
aggregate value of $11,000, need not trace funds to a particular criminal activity, 
finding that evidence of criminal activity and a lack of legitimate income is 
sufficient). 
67 United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2000). 
68 Id. at 355 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 357. 
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withdrawals of far more than $10,000 above the amount of clean funds 
available,” rejecting Davis’ contention that there was insufficient 
evidence to show that the transfers in question involved more than 
$10,000 in tainted funds.71 
The Davis court relied heavily on the rule in Heath, a rule 
developed for the interstate transfer of funds obtained by bank fraud.72 
This “aggregate” rule was then applied to the case at hand, using the 
government’s forensic accounting to determine that there were 
aggregate withdrawals over the $10,000 limit.73 The court also took 
particular care to distinguish the case from United States v. Poole, 
where they had reversed a conviction based on use of commingled 
funds because the check could have come from clean funds available 
in the account.74 Importantly, the Fifth Circuit explicitly chose its own 
precedent in the transfer of funds cases such as Heath, rather than 
adopting decisions of either the Fourth Circuit in Moore, or the Ninth 
Circuit in Rutgard.75  
 The outcomes of Moore and Davis stand in contrast with the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rutgard.76 In Rutgard, an 
ophthalmologist convicted of Medicare fraud faced a § 1957 charge 
for making transfers out of an account that was funded by Medicare 
payments, some of which were determined to be fraudulent.77 After 
first finding that only some of the funds the government alleged were 
fraudulently obtained could actually be shown to be illegal, and a 
careful analysis of the accounting provided by the government, the 
court found that the government could not show that the funds proven 
fraudulent had been touched by the transfers which served as the basis 




74 Id. (citing United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1977)).  
75 Id.  
76 See id. at 355-56; United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1290 (9th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994). 
77 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1290. 
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of the charges.78 After determining that only $46,000 of the money in 
the commingled account could be shown to be the profit of fraud, the 
court held that “so far as the evidence at trial goes, more than $46,000 
remained in the account” after the transfers in question, and that the 
“transfers did not necessarily transfer the $46,000 of fraudulent 
proceeds.”79 
One of the key components of Rutgard is the way the court 
differentiated the decisions dealing with § 1956, which 
overwhelmingly hold that commingling will not defeat a prosecution, 
with § 1957 law.80 Section 1956, the court held in agreement with 
other interpretations, is meant to catch even transfers which merely 
involve ill gotten funds.81 The court pointed out that the elimination of 
language which involves “the attempt to cleanse dirty money,” and the 
“intent to commit a crime or the design of concealing criminal fruits,” 
makes § 1957 a different, and potentially much broader law.82 The 
court held that § 1957 is a powerful tool because it makes “any dealing 
with a bank potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other 
defendant who has a hoard of criminal cash.”83 As such, the court 
reasoned that “such a powerful instrument of criminal justice should 
not be expanded by judicial invention or ingenuity.”84 The court here 
pointed out that had the government charged Rutgard with the deposit 
of fraudulent proceeds over $10,000, they probably would have 
succeeded based on the testimony of its accounting expert.85 However, 
in light of the fact that Rutgard was charged with transfer of the funds, 
it could not be shown without doubt that his transfers necessarily 
touched the $46,000 that the court found was fraudulently acquired.86 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1292. 
80 See id.  
81 Id. at 1291-92. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1292. 
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The court specifically mentioned the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Moore, saying that “unlike § 1956, § 1957 does not cover any funds 
‘involved.’”87 
In examining the circuit split surrounding commingling of funds 
in § 1957 cases, there are three slightly different holdings from each of 
the three circuits.88 The Fourth Circuit’s test in Moore, based largely 
on § 1956 precedent, seems to hold that commingling can never defeat 
prosecution, particularly when the transactions involve property rather 
than money.89 The Fifth Circuit in Davis relied on their own precedent 
in cases dealing with fraudulent transfers, took a careful look at the 
aggregate withdrawals and accounting and held that when the 
aggregate withdrawals exceeded the amount of clean money, the 
conviction will stand.90 Finally, in Rutgard, the Ninth Circuit took a 
close look at the legislative intent behind both § 1956 and § 1957 and 
determined that there are enough differences in the two statutes that 
they could not adopt the § 1956 precedent dealing with commingling, 
but rather placed the responsibility of accurate accounting on the 
government.91 
 
II. UNITED STATES V. HADDAD 
 
A. The Case 
 
 The Seventh Circuit squarely addressed 18 U.S.C. § 1957 in 
United States v. Haddad, a case which dealt with the foundational 
crime of wire fraud and included two counts of money laundering.92 
The case followed the misadventures of Anwar Haddad, who, in 
January of 2000 became the owner of a small “mom and pop” store 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994); Rutgard, 116 
F.3d at 1291; United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 1996).  
89 See Moore, 27 F.3d at 977. 
90 Davis, 226 F.3d at 357 
91 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291-92. 
92 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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called the R & F Grocery (R & F).93 R & F was a part of the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Stamp Program, a 
program which distributes “food stamp benefits” to low-income 
families to help them buy staple food items.94 With the advent of 
modern technology, food stamp benefits no longer actually involves 
the distribution of food stamps as such, but provides benefits through 
an Electronic Benefit Transfer, similar to a debit card, and known as a 
“LINK card” in the state of Illinois.95 As part of the Food Stamp and 
LINK program, participant stores are provided with a specialized 
point-of-sale machine which deducts money from the LINK card when 
food is purchased.96 When the participant scans their card and enters 
their unique PIN number, the machine checks the balance of the 
participants account and authorizes the sale of the staple food 
products.97 The store’s machine totals the food stamp sales at the end 
of the day and submits them to the food stamp program, which 
reimburses the store through an electronic deposit of funds that 
transfers directly into the store’s designated bank account.98 
 Eligibility for the Food Stamp Program is premised on vendors 
completing documentation and training programs which spell out the 
rules of the program.99 Chief amongst the rules of the program is that 
the vendor may not redeem food stamp benefits for ineligible items, or 
for cash.100 Haddad, upon becoming owner of R & F, signed the 
applications to continue as a food stamp-eligible vendor.101 
 In the summer of 2002, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) 
noticed that large numbers of people were gathering outside the R & F 
                                                 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 786-87. 
100 Id. at 787. 
101 Id. 
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Grocery around midnight on the first of the month.102 The CPD then 
contacted the United States Postal Inspection Service and the USDA to 
report the suspected food stamp fraud.103 The USDA compiled a list of 
R & F’s food stamp redemptions and found suspicious activity.104 The 
CPD followed up, and through investigation and use of a “CI” or 
confidential informant, found that R & F, and in fact Haddad himself, 
were exchanging food stamp benefits for cash at around 50 cents on 
the dollar.105  
 After his arrest on August 5, 2002, Haddad admitted that he had 
been trafficking in food stamps, and that he had instructed his 
employees to exchange food stamps for cash.106 A financial analysis of 
R & F’s bank records determined that of the $1,057,342.72 deposited 
in the store’s account from April 7, 2000 through August, 2002, 
$1,056,962.41 were electronic reimbursements from the Food Stamp 
Program, and only $345.31 were cash deposits.107 Further analysis of 
the store’s withdrawals and debits revealed that only $45,748.34 of the 
money deposited in the account went to purchase Food Stamp 
Program eligible inventory, while Haddad took $708,546.14 out of the 
account through checks written to himself or his family or deposits to 
a personal account at First Savings Bank of Hegeswich.108 Ultimately, 
two of these withdrawals, in the form of checks to Haddad and his 
other bank account formed the basis of the § 1957 charge.109 After 
being convicted of one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1343 and two counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1957, Haddad appealed, alleging entrapment on the wire fraud 
charges, insufficient evidence to convict him on the money laundering 
                                                 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 787-88. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 789. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 786. 
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counts, a mistake in jury instructions, and miscalculation of loss 
amount.110 
 Haddad’s argument regarding the money laundering counts rested 
on the premise that the government did not sufficiently prove that at 
least $10,000 of the checks which formed the foundation of the charge 
contained “illegitimate” funds.111 The Seventh Circuit was confronted 
with the fact that, in light of the information gleaned during the 
investigation, Haddad had “commingled legitimate and illegitimate 
business funds in the R & F business account,” though the 
government’s accounting showed that 99.96% of the money deposited 
in the account was from food stamp reimbursement.112 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning and Holding 
 
 The Seventh Circuit used a variety of precedent to make its 
decision on commingling of funds in United States v. Haddad.113 The 
court first cited its own holdings in cases dealing with § 1956.114 The 
court noted that “[i]n similar cases, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, we have 
reasoned that ‘[w]e cannot believe that Congress intended that 
participants in unlawful activity could prevent their own convictions 
under the money laundering statute simply by commingling funds 
derived from both ‘specified unlawful activities’ and other 
activities.’”115 The court also reasoned that the “government need not 
trace every dollar of income and connect it to a specific instance of 
laundering.”116  
                                                 
110 Id.. 
111 Id. at 791. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 791-92. 
114 Id. at 791. 
115 Id. at 791-92 (citing United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965-66 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
116 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792; see also Baker, 227 F.3d at 965-66; United States 
v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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 After looking at its own reasoning regarding commingling in § 
1956 cases, the court moved on to an examination of the decisions of 
other circuit courts to have looked at commingling in § 1957 cases.117 
First, the court examined the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. Moore.118 Quoting Moore, the court noted that “‘where the 
funds used in the particular transaction originated from a single source 
of commingled illegally-acquired and legally-acquired funds or from 
an asset purchased with such commingled funds, the government is 
not required to prove that no ‘untainted’ funds were involved, or that 
the funds used in the transaction were exclusively derived from the 
specified unlawful activities.’”119 
 The Seventh Circuit then found the Fifth Circuits “similar 
approach” in United States v. Davis to be instructive.120 The Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s use of its own precedent for 
commingled transfers.121 Citing Davis, the court agreed that “‘when 
tainted money is mingled with untainted money in a bank account, 
there is no longer any way to distinguish the tainted from the untainted 
because money is fungible.’”122 
 While Haddad advocated use of the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
commingled funds, the Seventh Circuit found this “framework 
untenable.”123 The Seventh Circuit court interpreted the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to hold that “in the case of withdrawal of funds from 
a commingled account, the government could only prove that 
illegitimate funds were withdrawn if all of the funds in the account are 
proven to be criminally derived.”124 The court then returned to its own 
                                                 
117 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
120 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
123 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
124 Id. (citing United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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precedent, finding that in the “analogous area of Section 1956 cases 
that the Rutgard ‘all or nothing’ approach is unworkable.”125 
 After interpreting the precedent available, and evaluating the three 
different holdings of the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit found that 
Haddad had indeed violated § 1957.126 The court found that the 
“government proved aggregate withdrawals of far more than $10,000 
above the amount of clean funds available.”127 Continuing, the court 
noted that “the vast majority of funds transferred to the Haddad’s 
business account from the food stamp reimbursements were not 
supported by evidence of legitimate food sales.”128 The Seventh 
Circuit then expressly adopted “the Fourth and Fifth Circuit 
approaches to the Section 1957 cases and therefore find that the 




 Given that almost all of the money in Haddad’s business account 
came from USDA reimbursements that he could not properly account 
for, and the amount of clearly legitimate cash was negligible, the 
Seventh Circuit was ultimately correct in its decision.130 While the 
Seventh Circuit did arrive at the right decision, they missed an 
opportunity to clarify and distinguish § 1957 jurisprudence from § 
1956 cases. First, by placing too much reliance on § 1956 precedent, 
the Seventh Circuit failed to account for differences in the two 
statutes. Second, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning glosses over 
important differences and similarities between the tests of the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in § 1957 cases. 
 
                                                 
125 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792 (citing United States v. Jackson, 95 F.2d 832, 840 
(7th Cir. 1991)). 




130 Id. at 791. 
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A. Over-reliance on § 1956 Precedent 
 
 To come to its decision in Haddad, the Seventh Circuit relied 
heavily on both its own precedent in § 1956 money laundering cases, 
and in the decisions of other courts that were influenced by § 1956 
precedent.131 This heavy reliance on § 1956 fails to account for 
differences between it and § 1957, a difference illustrated by a 
comparison of the two statutes, and by the circumstances of the § 1956 
cases in question.132 
 While both 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 deal with the 
same general subject, the two statutes clearly have differences.133 
Section 1956 seems to address more squarely the original intent of the 
Money Laundering Act of 1986 as it was presented to Congress.134 
Congress’ intent in enacting money laundering statutes was to close 
loopholes in reporting law caused by narrow interpretation of 
transaction reporting laws which dealt only with transactions of more 
than $10,000.135 The language of § 1956 also requires that the activity 
upon which the charge is based be designed to conceal the origins of 
the money involved.136 Combining Congress’ goal of preventing 
“structuring crimes” meant to evade reporting limits with the statutes 
clearly stated requirement that the transaction be undertaken with the 
intent to conceal the illegal funds strongly suggests that § 1956 should 
never be defeated by commingling of funds. In fact, in the § 1956 
                                                 
131 Id. at 791-92; see also United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965-66 (7th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576 (7th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 
840 (7th Cir. 1991). 
132 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1957; see also Baker, 
227 F.3d 955; Smith, 223 F.3d 554; Jackson, 935 F.2d 832. 
133 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1957; see also Strafer, supra 
note 9, at 161. 
134 See SEN. REP. NO. 99-433, 1-42 (1986). 
135 Strafer, supra note 9, at 159-60. 
136 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B); § 1956 (a)(2)(B); see also Kaufman, et. al., 
supra note 20, at 799. 
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cases dealing with commingling, the commingling can be construed to 
be part of the conspiracy to conceal the illegal money.137 
 Section 1957 represents a potentially broader law.138 Its intent has 
been perceived to be to “dissuade people from conducting even 
ordinary commercial transactions with people suspected to be involved 
in criminal activity.”139 There is no requirement that the accused 
money launderer under § 1957 have any intent to further or conceal 
the unlawful activity.140 Section 1957 instead relies on a threshold 
value to determine whether or not a violation has occurred.141  
 The importance of the threshold limit and the differences is best 
illustrated in the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the two statutes in United 
States v. Rutgard.142 The Ninth Circuit court noted that five elements 
differentiate § 1956 from § 1957; “its title, its requirement of intent, its 
broad reference to ‘the property involved,’ its satisfaction by a 
transaction that ‘in part’ accomplishes the design, and its requirement 
that the intent be to commit another crime or to hide the fruits of a 
crime already committed.”143 The Rutgard court noted that “the 
description of the crime does not speak to the attempt to cleanse dirty 
money by putting in a clean form and so disguising it,” but that “[t]he 
statute applies to the most open, above-board transaction.”144 The 
Ninth Circuit called § 1957 “a powerful tool . . . mak[ing] any dealing 
with a bank potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other 
                                                 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The 
‘clean’ money was also ‘involved in’ the conspiracy in that . . . it helped further and 
facilitate the operation”); United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1134 (5th Cir. 
1997) (“because ‘clean’ money that is commingled with ‘unclean’ money facilitates 
the money laundering operation, the ‘clean’ money is ‘involved’ in the offense”). 
138 Strafer, supra note 9, at 161. 
139 Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 798 (citing H. REP. NO. 99-855,at 14 
(1986)). 
140 Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 798. 
141 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a). 
142 United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1997). 
143 Id.  
144 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (broadly defining “monetary 
transaction”)). 
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defendant who has a hoard of criminal cash derived from specific 
crimes.”145 Calling it a “draconian law, . . . powerful by its elimination 
of criminal intent,” the Ninth Circuit strongly cautions that “[s]uch a 
powerful instrument of criminal justice should not be expanded by 
judicial invention or ingenuity.”146 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found 
that they “do not find helpful in interpreting § 1957 cases the cases 
applying § 1956.”147  
 The Seventh Circuit made a mistake when it applied its § 1956 
precedent to the facts in Haddad.148 The two statutes were intended to 
serve different purposes, and developed in different ways.149 By 
relying too heavily on inappropriate § 1956 precedent, the Seventh 
Circuit did nothing to clarify § 1957 enforcement. 
 
B. Use of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Holdings 
 
 The Seventh Circuit also based its decision in Haddad on the 
holdings of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit court decisions.150 In 
interpreting these decisions, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts’ tests agreed, while the Ninth Circuit 
court’s test was judged inappropriate.151 This analysis failed to 
properly dissect the decisions of the other circuit courts, and missed 
important similarities and differences. 
 
                                                 
145 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2006). 
149 See Strafer, supra note 9, at 161 (noting that the two statutes grew out of 
the different houses of Congress, with § 1956 developed primarily in the Senate and 
§ 1957 originating in the House of Representatives). 
150 Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 at 192. 
151 Id. 
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1. Use of the Moore decision 
 
The Seventh Circuit began its examination of other circuit court 
law by looking at the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Moore.152 In Moore, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the issue of 
commingling in the context of a real estate transaction whose 
financing was premised on fraudulently acquired loans.153 The 
evidence in Moore showed that the real estate involved, several 
commercial condominiums, were purchased with $926,000 obtained 
by bank fraud and the sale of legitimately acquired properties with an 
estimated value of $100,000.154 Given that the “overwhelming bulk” 
of the purchase money was acquired through fraud, and that this fraud 
effectively made the condominium purchase possible, the court held 
that the “jury was entitled to conclude . . . that when the 
condominiums were eventually sold, the net proceeds of that sale were 
in their entirety property derived from or developed out of the 
proceeds of Moore’s bank fraud.”155 The court noted that, “when funds 
obtained from unlawful activity have been combined with funds from 
lawful activity into a single asset, the illicitly-acquired funds and the 
legitimately-acquired funds (or the respective portions of the property 
purchased with each) cannot be distinguished from each other.”156 
In each of the other cases dealing with commingling under § 
1957, the courts dealt with mixing of funds in legitimate bank 
accounts rather than a monolithic transaction such as the sale of the 
condominiums.157 The Fourth Circuit correctly held that commingling 
in a single asset cannot defeat prosecution.158 When the transaction 
                                                 
152 Id. 
153 United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 976-77. 
157 See United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rutgard, 116 
F.3d 1270, 1290-1291 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Moore, 27 F.3d at 976-77. 
158 Moore, 27 F.3d at 977. 
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involves withdrawals from a mixed account, however, it becomes 
inappropriate to approach the transaction in the same way as a real 
estate sale. Given that § 1957 requires that the transaction have a 
“value greater than $10,000 . . . derived from specified unlawful 
activity,” it becomes necessary for a court faced with commingled 
funds in a bank account to provide a more accurate accounting of the 
value of the charged transaction.159 The Seventh Circuit erred when it 
relied on the Fourth Circuit’s test in Haddad. 
 
2. Use of the Davis decision 
 
 The second of the circuit court cases examined by the Seventh 
Circuit in Haddad was the Davis case out of the Fifth Circuit.160 In the 
Davis case, the Fifth Circuit paid close attention to the accounting 
evidence presented by the government.161 After analyzing the 
accounting, the court rested its decision on the “aggregate withdrawal” 
precedent of its fraudulent transfer cases such as Heath and Poole.162 
The Fifth Circuit noted that using the aggregate withdrawal method is 
appropriate because “[t]o view each transaction in isolation . . . would 
defeat the purposes of the statute.”163 The Fifth Circuit further refined 
their test by contrasting it with the test advanced in Rutgard, rejecting 
the notion that the entire balance must be withdrawn.164 
 While the Seventh Circuit indicated that they agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding, they failed to mention the aggregate 
withdrawal aspect of that court’s holding.165 By failing to 
acknowledge this aspect of the decision, particularly the Davis court’s 
                                                 
159 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a) (2006); see, e.g., Rutgard , 116 F.3d at 1291; Davis, 
226 F.3d at 357. 
160 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
161 Davis, 226 F.3d at 356, 357. 
162 Id. at 357; see also United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1404 (5th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1977). 
163 Heath, 970 F.3d at 357. 
164 Id. (citing Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1292). 
165 Haddad, 462, F.3d at 792. 
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mention of the Poole decision, the Seventh Circuit missed the weight 
the Fifth Circuit placed on accounting.166 
 
3. Rejection of the Rutgard decision 
 
 The final case that the Seventh Circuit used to decide Haddad was 
United States v. Rutgard.167 Rutgard is important for two reasons. 
First, the court in Rutgard advanced a reasonable argument that 
commingling in § 1956 and § 1957 should not be compared.168 
Second, with the exception of the finding that “all the funds” in the 
questionable account must have been withdrawn to uphold Rutgard’s 
conviction, the Ninth Circuit’s general rule, and their heavy reliance 
on accounting evidence are analogous to the Fifth Circuit’s “aggregate 
withdrawal” test.169  
 The Seventh Circuit made no mention of the Ninth Circuit’s 
argument that § 1956 and § 1957 precedent should be kept separate.170 
In fact, the Seventh Circuit made a point of comparing its own § 1956 
precedent with the Rutgard holding.171 The Seventh Circuit also failed 
to note the similarities between the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Davis 
and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rutgard.172 While the Seventh 
Circuit’s rejection of the “all of nothing” aspect of Rutgard was 
correct, it missed an opportunity to extract and amplify the aspects of 
the Ninth Circuit’s test that coincide with the Fifth Circuit’s test, and 
to advance the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding the differences 
between commingling in § 1956 and § 1957 law.173 
 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1290-92. 
169 Id. at 1292; see also United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 356-57 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
170 Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
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IV. SECTION 1957 AFTER HADDAD 
 
 The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity in deciding Haddad. 
With the evidence at hand, it was clear that Haddad had in fact 
violated § 1957 by writing checks in amounts greater than $10,000 on 
an account that could be shown to be almost entirely funded with the 
profits of food stamp fraud.174 In deciding this case as they did, the 
Seventh Circuit has left the door open to a potential broadening of the 
law. In § 1956 cases commingling of funds is often intentional, and 
serves to meet the requirement that the transaction be conducted “with 
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.”175 
Section 1957, however, contains no “intent to promote” element, 
relying on the value of the transaction.176 As such, while no amount of 
commingling should foil a § 1956 prosecution, a § 1957 prosecution 
should only rest on solid accounting that shows the value of the 
transaction was indeed “of a value greater than $10,000 . . . derived 
from specified unlawful activity.”177 
 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit could have reconciled the tests of 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.178 The Seventh Circuit should have 
recognized the differences between § 1956 and § 1957 that make it 
difficult to apply the § 1956 precedent.179  
 By stressing only the value of the transaction, and using § 1956 
law as comparison, the Seventh Circuit left open ended the question of 
whether, or what amount, of commingling of funds will or will not foil 
a prosecution under § 1957. While Haddad had obviously violated the 
law, the question of whether all transfers from a commingled account 
invokes § 1957 remains open. The Seventh Circuit has provided no 
                                                 
174 Id. at 791. 
175 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
176 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
177 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a). 
178 See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir.2000); United States 
v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1997). 
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1957; Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92; 
see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 160; Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 796, 798.: 
Boran, supra note 8, at 851-53. 
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guidance on what to do when the amount of legal and illegal funding 
is equal, or if the balance tips toward legal funds. Without a better test, 




 The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to amalgamate and 
solidify the various court’s disparate rulings regarding the 
commingling of funds in § 1957 cases. Had the court reconciled the 
similar tests of the Fifth Circuit in Davis and the Ninth Circuit in 
Rutgard, rejected Rutgard’s all-or-nothing approach, and recognized 
the fundamental differences between § 1956 and § 1957, it could have 
articulated a test that would clarify the law.  
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